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Abstract 
 
We introduce the notion of opportunistic networks or 
oppnets, some of which can be considered a subclass of 
the  peer-to-peer  (P2P)  networks.  Initially,  a  relatively 
small seed oppnet is deployed, which grows into a bigger 
expanded  oppnet.  Oppnet  growth  starts  with  detecting 
diverse  systems  existing  in  its  relative  vicinity.  Systems 
with best evaluations are invited by an oppnet to become 
its helpers. The oppnet leverages vast collective capabili-
ties and resources of its helpers, employing them to exe-
cute diverse tasks in support of its goals. Though oppnet 
characteristics  make  them  a  natural  fit  for  emergency 
response  applications,  we  expect  that  they  will  prove 
beneficial  in  many  other  application  areas.  We  discuss 
challenges in the development and use of the oppnet tech-
nology. Oppnets that use P2P interactions can be viewed 
as a specialization of the more general paradigm of P2P 
networks. To the best of our knowledge, we were the first 
to define and are now the first to investigate oppnets. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We propose to chart a new direction within the area of 
peer-to-peer  (P2P)  computing  by  exploring  in  the  P2P 
context  the  opportunistic  networks  or  oppnets.  Oppnets 
that use the P2P paradigm can be considered a subclass of 
P2P  networks.  By  investigating  this  new  paradigm  and 
technology within the P2P area, we add to this workshop, 
which—as  stated  by  the  organizers  in  the  Call  for  Pa-
pers—focuses  on  the  general  theme  of  P2P  computing. 
The  discussion  on  oppnets  using  P2P  interactions  as  a 
specialized category of P2P networks follows the presen-
tation of oppnets in sufficient detail. 
Oppnets,  invented  by  us,  differ  from traditional net-
works, in which the nodes of a single network are all de-
ployed together, with the size of the network and locations 
of its nodes pre-designed  (either in a fully “deterministic” 
fashion, or with a certain degree of randomness, as is the 
case with ad hoc networks). The initial seed oppnet grows 
into an expanded oppnet by integrating foreign nodes that 
become  its  helpers  in  realization  of  the oppnet’s goals. 
The size of the expanded network and locations of all but 
some of its “seed” nodes can not be even approximately 
predicted. 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  networks  similar  to 
oppnets  have  not  been  studied  by  others.  Precursors  of 
oppnets—opportunistic  sensor  networks—were  just  sig-
naled earlier by one of us [BLRW04]. The results of our 
work on oppnets published to date include a presentation 
of  the  oppnet  concept  with  a  characterization  of  its  re-
search challenges exclusively in the areas of privacy and 
security  [LKBG06]).  This  paper  presents research chal-
lenges in realization of the basic oppnet operations and 
shows oppnets that are a subclass of P2P networks. 
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes basic opp-
net operations and applications; Section 3 sketches related 
work; Section 4 presents research challenges confronting 
implementation of oppnets; Section 5 discusses oppnets as 
P2P networks; and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Basics of Oppnet Operation 
 
2.1. Seed Oppnet and Its Growth 
 
Each oppnet grows from a pre-designed seed oppnet, 
or simply a seed, which is a set of nodes employed to-
gether at the time of the initial oppnet deployment. It can 
have a few arbitrarily powerful nodes, in the extreme even 
a single super-node. A seed can be wireless and ad hoc, 
with nodes not carefully pre-positioned but, for example, 
thrown out of a plane or a car in the general disaster area. 
Once the seed becomes operational, its first task is to 
detect a set of “foreign” entities—devices, clusters, net-
works, or other systems—which it deems useful. The de-
tected entities are candidates for becoming helpers for the 
oppnet.  Each  such  candidate  helper  (or  simply    candi-
date) has a potential to provide oppnet with communica-
tion,  computing,  sensing,  or  other  capabilities  or  re-
sources.  Detection can be done by any means possible, 
both traditional and novel (cf. [GuAA05]). An oppnet can 
search for systems in its area using the range of Internet IP 
addresses, assigned to its own geographical area. It can 
even use artificial intelligence techniques for visual detec-
tion of systems and appliances with embedded chips. For 
example, it can visually detect a car within the surveil-
lance area of a helper that already joined the oppnet, read 
the license plate, check if the car is equipped with the On-
Star™ system, and attempt to contact it if it is. 
Candidates  are  evaluated  by  the oppnet, and the best 
ones are invited by the oppnet to join it. They can either accept or refuse the invitation. However, in life-or-death 
situations, candidates are ordered to join, and must agree 
to be conscripted in the spirit of citizens called to arms (or 
suffer the consequences of going AWOL).  
By admitting candidates, a seed oppnet grows into an 
expanded  oppnet,  while  the  admitted  entities  become 
helpers, and collaborate on realization of oppnet’s goals. 
 
2.2. Oppnet Helpers 
 
Helpers are highly diversified both in terms of software 
and hardware, including wired and wireless, free-standing 
and  embedded  devices.  E.g.,  the  set  of  helpers  can  in-
clude: (a) a computer network contacted via a wired Inter-
net  link;  (b)  a cellular  infrastructure—via  oppnet’s  cell-
phone peripheral; (c) a satellite system—via a direct satel-
lite link; (d) a HAN (home area network)— via wireless-
equipped embedded processor in a refrigerator; (e) a Wi-
MAX network—via a microwave relay; (f) a BAN (body 
area network) of a car passenger—via an OnStar system. 
In general, working in an “emergency mode” does not 
require any new functionalities from helpers. For example, 
in case of fire monitoring tasks, a weather sensornet that 
became a helper can be simply told to stop collecting pre-
cipitation data, and use the released resources to increase 
the sampling rates for temperature and wind direction.  
It is possible that more powerful helpers could be re-
programmed on the fly.  Also, oppnet nodes might be built 
with excess general-purpose communication, computation, 
storage, sensing, and other capabilities useful in case of 
unforeseen  emergencies.  For  example,  excess  sensing 
capabilities could be facilitated by multisensor devices. 
 
2.3. Applications for Oppnets 
 
We see important applications for oppnets first of all 
(not exclusively) in all kinds of emergency situations, e.g., 
in response to man-made or natural disasters in the area of 
homeland  security  [NSHS02]. Oppnets can significantly 
improve effectiveness and efficiency of such operations. 
For  predictable  disasters  (like  hurricanes),  seed  opp-
nets  can be put into action and their buildup started (or 
even completed) before the disaster, when it is still much 
easier to locate and invite other nodes and clusters into the 
oppnet. The first invited helpers could be the sensornets 
deployed  for  structural  damage  monitoring  and  assess-
ment in buildings, roads, and bridges. 
Oppnets, as most non-trivial technologies, can be ma-
levolent—deployed  to  harm  humans, their artifacts, and 
technical infrastructure they rely upon [LKBG06]. 
Opportunistic networks are an example of developing 
application-oriented  specializations  of  ad  hoc  networks 
[Lili06].  
Opportunistic networks can be extended to opportunis-
tic  systems  by  providing  application-oriented  primitives 
above the network layer. 
 
3. Related Work 
 
We can view oppnets as being within the intersection 
of ad hoc, P2P, and sensor networks. After adjustments, 
they can use node localization and self-organization tech-
niques  from  ad  hoc  networks,  growth-by-joining  ap-
proaches from P2P, and data aggregation algorithms from 
sensornets.  Hence,  the  fact  that  a  lot  of  related  work 
comes from these three areas should not be surprising. 
We look at more categories of related work on tech-
nologies potentially useful for oppnets, including: (1) in-
teroperability  research—on  highly  heterogeneous  wired 
and  wireless  types  of  communication  media,  networks, 
devices, and protocols; (2) grid computing—for resource 
integration  and  management;  and  (3)  benevolent  Tro-
jans—for helper search. There is a tremendous amount of 
knowledge and experience in these and other related areas 
that we can learn from—but cannot employ ‘as-is’ in opp-
nets, due to their unique characteristics. We omit the de-
tailed discussion of related areas due to space limitations. 
 
4. Challenges in Oppnets 
 
In this section we delineate the challenges in develop-
ment and use of oppnets.  
Challenge 1:   Optimizing the seed oppnet infrastructure. 
Measures and criteria for optimization of seed oppnets 
in their deployment environments are needed. They must 
allow quantitative specification of at least communication, 
computational, sensing, and energy resources. They will 
enable optimal design of seed oppnets. 
Researchers need to characterize the minimal seed opp-
net configuration that assures a credible execution of opp-
net tasks (e.g., the minimal configuration of the seed). 
Next, they need to provide techniques for optimization 
of  seed  oppnets  required  to  most  successfully  achieve 
oppnet goals (e.g., determining optimal locations of seed 
nodes and optimal seed sizes). The techniques might be 
probabilistic if a seed is deployed without precise posi-
tioning—e.g., when dispersed from the air.  
Challenge 2:   Developing methods for detecting helpers 
with useful resources and facilities. 
Researchers must devise efficient oppnet algorithms for 
discovery of potential helpers, whether they are individual 
nodes, clusters and entire networks. For example, current 
solutions  for  detection  (via  localization)  of  neighboring 
nodes in sensornets use a single technology – based on 
GPS,  radio,  ultrasound,  IP  address  or  cellular  network. Oppnets  should  attempt  to  detect  any  useful  systems 
available in their neighborhood. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there are no solutions that fuse the localization data 
obtained by all diverse technologies in a way that would 
satisfy the needs of oppnets. 
Challenge  2.1:      Designing  integrated  communication 
media for oppnets. 
This  is  logically  a  subset  of  the  preceding  challenge 
(hence the two-part number for it) but, due to its impor-
tance and effort required, warrants to be listed separately. 
Providing means of communications between an oppnet 
and all potential helper systems is a significant problem. 
Each of these systems may have distinct and disjoint me-
dia of communication, with unique protocols for informa-
tion transfer. It may be as complex as 802.11b, or as sim-
plistic  as  communicating  binary  values  of  motion  or 
no_motion coming from a motion sensor.  
An oppnet should be able to detect and contact potential 
helpers, and communicate with them over their preferred 
medium and with their preferred protocols. This approach 
would be similar to a multi-agent system [Flor03], where 
agents try to collaborate to achieve a common goal. How-
ever, oppnets cannot use a common language, protocol or 
format for communications, as they do not share an ontol-
ogy with all potential helpers. 
In the future, lightweight facilities that enable a shared 
ontology to assist oppnets in helper discovery could be-
come a standard portion of any potential helper, be it a 
desktop, a laptop, a handheld, or an embedded device. In 
the absence of such means, the burden of detecting helpers 
rests on the (seed or expanded) oppnet. 
Prioritized emergency communication channels should 
be considered. In particular, researchers should investigate 
whether the critical response operations of oppnets should 
be segregated from other emergency tasks. 
Challenge 3:   Designing methods for inviting candidate 
helpers, and methods for controlling helpers.  
Researchers must design protocols for inviting and ad-
mitting  candidate  systems  into  oppnets.   First, we need 
algorithms to determine which candidates from the pool of 
available ones to invite. To this end, systems useful for 
oppnets must be prioritized based on their capabilities and 
functionalities. The potential helpers should be evaluated 
at  least  in terms of the value of their resources for the 
oppnet. The priorities could determine the order in which 
oppnets will invite different (classes of) devices. For ex-
ample, an oppnet may decide that inviting communication 
systems (such as cellular infrastructures) has the highest 
priority, since they extend oppnet coverage considerably.  
A  prioritization  scheme  will  enable  a  systematic  ap-
proach to inviting helpers. In a simple case, oppnet could 
start with a search for communication systems, then move 
to  systems  with  critical  processing  abilities,  finally  to 
sensing systems. In a more complex case, oppnet could 
start with a search for a system with communication capa-
bilities characterized by a measure C1 with the value at 
least equal to c1, and with sensing capabilities character-
ized by a measure S2 with the value at least equal to s2. 
Priorities will indicate which candidates can help more 
than others.  Optimal candidate selection algorithms can 
then assure the best area and functional coverage, with, 
e.g., a minimal number of invited systems or with a certain 
degree of coverage redundancy for fault tolerance. 
Whenever possible, oppnet algorithms should perform 
a priori evaluation of trustworthiness of helper candidates, 
to avoid inviting unreliable or malicious ones. 
Customized protocols for inviting candidates to join an 
oppnet are needed. Their design should be preceded by 
investigation of usefulness of existing protocols for con-
tacting and inviting candidate helpers. Researchers should 
consider use of incentives to encourage systems reluctant 
to join, as well as use of penalties for systems that refuse 
to join in life-or-death situations. Lightweight facilities to 
answer to invitations from oppnets could become in the 
future a standard portion of any potential helper. 
Challenge 4:    Developing  methods  for  deciding  which 
tasks should be “offloaded” by oppnet to its helpers, and 
techniques for coordinating helper tasks by oppnets.  
Oppnets must be aware that different helpers might be 
suited  in  varying  degrees  for  different  tasks.    Helpers 
should be classified w.r.t. their capabilities for performing 
different classes of tasks to be offloaded to them. 
Similarly, to ensure the best use of helper capabilities, 
oppnet tasks need be classified according to their suitabil-
ity for offloading to a given set of available helpers. Pre-
requisites  for  this  classification  contain:  (a)  identifying 
and exploiting idiosyncrasies of oppnet tasks—including 
the basic tasks of self-organization, reorganization, local-
ization  of  neighboring  nodes,  and  aggregation;  and  (b) 
analyzing differences between oppnet tasks and the analo-
gous tasks in related systems (e.g., P2P), incl. basic tasks. 
The assignment of tasks to helpers must consider that 
some helpers may be more trusted than others. For exam-
ple, only the most trusted helpers may be permitted by the 
oppnet  to contact and invite other systems to join. The 
metric of trust could be based on the level of trust estab-
lished between the oppnet and the helpers.  
We need algorithms for offloading the tasks to helpers 
and  controlling  their  execution.  Helpers  could  maintain 
low-level control, while oppnets should probably assure 
the high-level supervision and decision-making. 
Aggregation tasks might be a special category of tasks 
for  offloading.  To  be  effective,  oppnet  algorithms must 
identify: (a) information that needs to be aggregated; (b) 
efficient aggregating techniques; and (c) appropriate help-
ers able to use these techniques for processing these data. 
The algorithms must recognize data that needs preprocess-ing—such as image rectification, enhancement and classi-
fication—before it can yield useful information, and iden-
tify helpers capable of handling such preprocessing.  
The algorithms must consider scenarios where helpers 
as powerful (either individually or collectively) as needed 
do not exist within the oppnet. If new helpers can not be 
found in time, a decision must be made what to do with 
overwhelming information that can not be processed. For 
example, the oppnet might decide to use restricted data 
processing algorithms instead of comprehensive ones.  
Challenge 5:    Proposing  ways  of  managing  oppnets, 
including  control  of  privacy  and  security  problems  in 
oppnets. 
Management  algorithms  for  controlling  oppnet  nodes 
are needed, including algorithms for identifying inefficient 
or suspicious members of an oppnet, and dismissing them 
when necessary. Even members of the original seed opp-
net can be dismissed under such circumstances.  
Once the goals of an oppnet have been achieved and its 
activity is no longer needed, it should release its helpers 
and contacted candidates. Furthermore, the released sys-
tems should be able to quickly return to their normal op-
erations, without any unwelcome residue from the tasks 
performed as helpers in an oppnet. 
Oppnets are pervasive computing systems. Since huge 
privacy  risks  are  associated  with  pervasive  computing, 
privacy  is  the  “make  it  or  break  it”  issue  for  oppnets, 
which  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  our  earlier  paper 
[LKBG06].  Privacy  solutions  can  be  divided  into  three 
categories  for  protecting  oppnets,  new  helpers,  and  the 
environment from each other: (1) protecting oppnets from 
their helpers and the environment, (2) protecting helpers 
from oppnets and the environment, and (3) protecting the 
environment from oppnets and helpers. For example, pri-
vacy  of  entities  under  oppnet  surveillance  can  be  pro-
tected by assuring their anonymity or pseudonymity. 
Some relaxation of the strictest privacy protection stan-
dards  might be permissible. Especially in life-and-death 
situations, saving a life of a person takes precedence over 
her  or  somebody  else’s  privacy.  For  example,  a  victim 
searching for help will probably not object to an oppnet 
taking over control over her Body Area Network (BAN). 
Security controls for oppnets are needed. Some are dis-
cussed in our earlier paper [LKBG06]. Examples include 
planting spies in suspicious networks, or using the honey-
pot approach [ChBe02]. Malevolent oppnets, which either 
hide their malicious activities, or masquerade as benevo-
lent oppnets, must also be considered. Algorithms for their 
detection and uncovering of their real goals are needed. 
Challenge 6:    Analyzing  performance  of  oppnet  algo-
rithms and protocols, including the ones for localization, 
invitation, task offloading and coordination. 
Metrics for evaluating effectiveness and efficiency of 
the  oppnet  algorithms  and  protocols  are  needed.    They 
must enable quantitative specification and optimization of 
at least communication, computational, sensing, and en-
ergy resources, as well as an optimization of the oppnet 
size and of the quality of its localization. 
We also need methods and guidelines for carrying out 
theoretical analyses, simulations, testbed experiments, etc. 
 
5. Opportunistic  Computing  and  P2P  Com-
puting 
 
We start this section with viewing oppnets in the light 
of definitions of P2P Computing. Steinmetz and Wehrle 
[StWe05]  state:  “The  P2P  approach  […]  reflects  the 
paradigm  shift  from  coordination  to  cooperation,  from 
centralization  to  decentralization,  and  from  control  to 
incentives.” Oppnets fully support this paradigm shift. 
According to Milojicic et al. [MKLN02], “Conceptu-
ally, P2P computing is an alternative to the centralized 
and  client-server  models  of  computing,  where  there  is 
typically a single or small cluster of servers and many 
clients.  […]  In  its  purest  form,  the  P2P  model  has  no 
concept  of  server;  rather  all  participants  are  peers.” 
Since, in general, oppnets are neither centralized nor cli-
ent-server systems, by this concise definition oppnets fit 
the P2P model—but not necessarily the pure P2P model. 
The same paper [MKLN02] provides a more descrip-
tive definition of P2P systems: The term “peer-to-peer” 
refers to a class of systems and applications that employ 
distributed resources to perform a critical function in a 
decentralized manner. The resources encompass comput-
ing  power,  data  (storage  and  content),  network  band-
width,  and  presence  (computers,  human,  and  other  re-
sources). The critical function can be distributed comput-
ing, data/content sharing, communication and collabora-
tion, or platform services. Decentralization may apply to 
algorithms, data, and meta-data, or to all of them. This 
does not preclude retaining centralization in some parts 
of the systems and applications if it meets their require-
ments.  Typical  P2P  systems  reside  on  the  edge  of  the 
Internet or in ad-hoc networks. P2P enables: (a) valuable 
externalities, by aggregating resources through low-cost 
interoperability, the whole is made greater than the sum 
of its parts; (b) lower cost of ownership and cost sharing, 
by using existing infrastructure and by eliminating and 
distributing  the  maintenance  costs;  and 
(c) anonymity/privacy,  by  incorporating  these  require-
ments in the design and algorithms of P2P systems and 
applications, and by allowing peers a greater degree of 
autonomous  control  over  their  data  and  re-
sources. Oppnet characteristics directly match all proper-
ties mentioned in the above definition, possibly with the exception of anonymity. It is not critical to oppnets, but 
can be used, e.g., to protect the privacy of helpers. 
Shirky [Shir00] lists the following P2P characteristics: 
1) The definition: P2P is a class of applications that takes 
advantage  of  [unused]  resources  --  storage,  cycles, 
content, human presence -- available at the edges of 
the Internet. Because accessing these decentralized re-
sources means operating in an environment of unsta-
ble connectivity and unpredictable IP addresses, P2P 
nodes must operate outside the DNS system and have 
significant or total autonomy from central servers.  
2) The litmus test: (1) Does it treat variable connectivity 
and  temporary  network  addresses  as  the  norm?  (2) 
Does it give the nodes at the edges of the network sig-
nificant autonomy? An application is P2P if and only 
if the answer to both of those questions is “yes.” 
3)  Additional  ownership  test:  Another  way  to  examine 
“P2P or not P2P” is to think about ownership: "Who 
owns  the  hardware  that  the  service  runs  on?"  […] 
P2P is a way of decentralizing not just features, but 
costs and administration as well.  
Oppnets  satisfy  characteristics  of  Items  1  and  3  above. 
The answer to Item 2 might depend on one’s exact defini-
tions  of  the  notions  of “variable,” “temporary,” “norm”  
and “autonomy.” None of these notions is binary—each 
can be present in different degrees. Assuming the average 
“degrees” for each, oppnets satisfy Item 2 as well. 
So, are opportunistic systems P2P systems? 
Answering this question in most general terms is not 
be as easy as looking at how well oppnets fulfill the defi-
nitions of P2P systems. On the one hand, many oppnets 
can be seen as a subclass of P2P systems. Some oppnets 
will be a subclass of pure P2P networks—in particular the 
ones  that  grow  exclusively  by  asking  helpers  to  join 
(rather than ordering them to join). In most cases, oppnets 
will  be  a subclass  of  hybrid  P2P  networks—which  use 
P2P structures for some tasks and centralized or client-
server structures for others (e.g., if the seed retains the full 
control over the oppnet control, at least at the top level). 
On the other hand, some oppnets will not be P2P sys-
tems at all, since they will use no P2P interactions, only 
centralized or client-server interactions. 
Bi-level (or multi-level) structure of P2P systems and 
opportunistic systems can further complicate the answer to 
our question. For example, an opportunistic system that is 
a pure P2P system (relying exclusively on P2P interac-
tions above the network layer) can be built upon an oppor-
tunistic network that is a hybrid P2P network (relying on 
client-server and P2P interactions within the network layer 
and below). The answer must be given separately for each 
level of the opportunistic system. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper discusses research challenges to successful 
specialization  of  the  paradigm  of  P2P  networks  to  the 
restricted paradigm of opportunistic networks or oppnets. 
The  proposed  oppnet  approach  facilitates  connecting 
and  integrating  highly  heterogeneous  systems  that  were 
not designed to work together. This can be very valuable, 
e.g.,  in  disaster  areas  where  existing  communication  or 
information infrastructures have been damaged. 
Answering to the research challenges identified in this 
paper  will  advance  the  state  of  the  art  of  the  P2P  net-
works,  enable  new  applications,  and  improve  effective-
ness  and  efficiency  of  existing  applications  by  re-
developing them on top of oppnets. 
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